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I.  Introduction 
Seeking to ground antitrust in theoretical economics,1 we too often forget how 
deeply rooted and pervasive political, cultural, and historical values are in antitrust 
regulation and enforcement.2  In the words of former American Antitrust Institute 
Chairman Bert Foer, “antitrust should not be an isolated island grounded in 
theoretical models, but must be firmly attached to the mainland of political and 
economic life in America and elsewhere.”3 
Following the values-driven assertion of Chicago School disciples that “[b]asic 
microeconomic theory is of course a science,”4 American antitrust enforcement has 
sought since the late 1970s, to ground itself in supposedly neutral and scientific 
neoclassical economic models.5  Unfortunately, as the United States, the founder of 
 
1. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Retrospective and Perspective:  Where Are We Coming 
From?  Where Are We Going? in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 2, 3 (H. First, E. 
Fox & R. Pitofsky eds., 1991) (arguing that antitrust analyses have been “seduced by siren calls of 
theoretical [economic] purity”). 
2. See e.g., Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2543, 2544 (2013) (discussing “the democratic, economic, and political goals of the antitrust laws”); 
Fox & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing how antitrust’s strength flows from its “core values,” 
including “a preference for pluralism, freedom of trade, access to markets, and freedom of choice”); 
Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C.L. REV. 551, 556 (2012) (noting how 
“some enforcers [have] viewed antitrust’s more . . . political, social, and moral goals as somehow 
diluting antitrust policy,” and how “some courts and enforcers [have] sacrificed important political, 
social, and moral values to promote certain economic beliefs”); Robert Pitofsky, The Political 
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Thomas J. Horton, Competition or Monopoly?  
The Implications of Complexity Science, Chaos Theory, and Evolutionary Biology for Antitrust and 
Competition Policy, 51 ANTITRUST BULL.  195, 201 (2006) (“The history of the continuing debates as 
to antitrust legislation and regulation reveals that how people think about antitrust issues is 
generally tied to their underlying assumptions and premises, as well as their implied values”); 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 (1978) (discussing the 
fundamental disagreements about “the goals or values the [antitrust] law[s] may legitimately and 
profitably implement”). 
3. Albert Foer e-mail of December 31, 2014, to American Antitrust Institute Advisory Board (copy on 
file with author).  Mr. Foer adds:  “Antitrust plays a crucial role within a democratic political 
economy, doing its part to define the best balance for the time, recognizing the state of knowledge, 
of technology, and of institutional realities.”  Id. 
4. BORK, supra note 2, at 8.  Judge Richard Posner long has argued that Chicago School economics 
are “scientific, not ideological.”  RUDOLPH J.R. RERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA:  HISTORY, 
RHETORIC, LAW 228 (1996), discussing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); 
RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). 
5. Thomas J. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust:  China’s Emerging Approach to Anti-Monopoly 
Law, 47 INT’L LAW 193, 204 (2013) (discussing the “conservative economic agenda that has 
dominated American antitrust since the 1980s”); First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2545 (discussing 
America’s “move away from more democratically controlled institutions toward greater reliance on 
technical experts”); Stucke, supra note 2, at 563-66 (discussing the ascendance of neoclassical 
economic theories in antitrust jurisprudence since the late 1970s); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons 
for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis:  The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the ‘Too-
Big-to-Fail’ Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 281 (observing that “’Post-Chicago’ 
antitrust theory departs from the Chicago School views mostly around the margins”). 
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antitrust regulation, enters into its 126th year of antitrust regulation and 
enforcement, some critics, including this author, believe that the lax antitrust 
enforcement that began in the 1980s,6 has catalyzed a “slide of [American] antitrust 
into political irrelevance.”7 
Ironically, however, antitrust regulation and enforcement today is thriving 
globally.8  One country where antitrust enforcement is taking off is China, which is 
entering into only its eighth year of antitrust regulation and enforcement.9  China’s 
ascendance as a global antitrust enforcer is especially ironic, as until the late 1970s, 
China viewed the term competition as a “capitalist monster.”10 
Although “anti-monopoly efforts are a very new phenomenon in China,”11 China 
today finds itself under an intense global microscope.  “Though many jurisdictions 
have adopted competition laws in recent decades, none of those laws has engendered 
the level of interest sparked by China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML).”12  Such 
 
6. See e.g. Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST, supra note 2, 
at 530 (“During the 1980s, we witnessed the most lenient antitrust enforcement program in fifty 
years”); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 10 (“…the blueprint of the Reagan Administration has not 
been seriously shaken…European competition policy has surpassed American policy in its vigilance 
against anticompetitive restraints”);  Stucke, supra note 2, at 553-557 (describing how “antitrust’s 
influence in the United States has diminished”). 
7. First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2543; See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  
PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 1-10 (2005); Jonathon B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain:  The 
Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 
ANTITRUST L. J. 605 (2010). 
8. See e.g. Stucke, supra note 2, at 551-552 (“The past twenty years witnessed more countries with 
antitrust laws and the birth and growth of the international organization of governmental 
competition authorities, the International Competition Network (ICN), with over 100 member 
countries”). 
9. “In August 2008, 118 years after the Sherman Act and 50 years after the Treaty of Rome, China’s 
own Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) came into effect.”  CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW:  THE FIRST FIVE 
YEARS xxxvii (Adrian Emch & David Stallibrass, eds., 2013); see also Wing Gar Cheng, China’s 
Watchdog intensifies efforts to enforce regulatory conditions, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013) (“. . . 
the country’s relatively young antitrust regime is moving towards a more complete and enforced 
regulatory framework”). 
10. Xiaoye Wang, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law:  A Survey of a Work in Progress, 54 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 579, 580 (2009); See also Stucke, supra note 2, at 552.  In China’s 1980 Political Economic 
Dictionary, “’competition’ was defined as ‘fighting between producers for economic benefit, under a 
system of private ownership;’ in a capitalist system, ‘due to competition and lack of government 
planning in production, society’s labour and resources cannot achieve rational allocation or full 
utilization, leading to a serious waste of productive power…without government control, regulation 
of competition and production is ineffectual.’”  WANG supra note 10, at 30, quoting POLITICAL 
ECONOMICS DICTIONARY 597-99 (Xu Dixin, ed., 1980). 
11. CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 9, at xxxvii. 
12. H. STEPHEN HARRIS, JR., PETER J. WANG, YIZHE ZHANG, MARK A. COHEN & SEBASTIAN J. EVRARD, 
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 8 (2011).  The reasons for the high level of global 
interest include:  “the sheer scale and astounding growth of China’s markets, the vast amounts of 
foreign capital invested in China, the burgeoning sales of Chinese goods abroad, the substantial 
growth in the participation of Chinese firms in foreign markets, and a recognition of the significant 
challenge posed by the establishment of free market competition in China’s socialist market 
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international scrutiny seems natural and expected given that the promulgation of 
China’s AML can “be regarded as a great achievement of international 
cooperation.”13  Furthermore, as observed by former U.S. Antitrust AAG Hewitt 
Pate, “U.S. and European officials have often approached China like a recruiting 
prospect – as a new player to be won over to U.S. or European styles of antitrust.”14 
Although China’s legal system and anti-monopoly regulatory efforts are still “a 
work in progress,”15 key trends and patterns in China’s enforcement of its AML are 
emerging.  First and foremost, China is aggressively charting its own course.16  
China sees its AML enforcement as an integral part of its mission of “safeguarding 
market order and achieving social fairness and justice [in] establish[ing] an initial 
law regime for the socialist market economy.”17  China’s leaders view “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics and the Chinese dream [as] the main theme of our age.”18  
So it should hardly come as a surprise or shock anyone that China will continue to 
see one of its primary anti-monopoly missions as carrying out AML Article 1’s 
mandate of “promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy.”19 
Of course, the Chinese are astute enough to recognize that it was the United 
 
economy.” Id. 
13. XIAOYE WANG, THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 313 (2014). Professor Wang 
further notes:  “[I]t is no surprise that many good provisions from other well-established antitrust 
laws have been incorporated into the Chinese AML.” Id. See also Horton, Confucianism and 
Antitrust, supra note 5, at 196 (“American, European, and Japanese antitrust and competition 
regulators, lawyers, and economists have taken understandable pride in counseling and helping 
China in drafting, adopting, and interpreting its new AML”); HARRIS, ET AL., supra note 12, at 2-3 
(“The core provisions of the AML were modeled on EU competition law, and to a lesser extent, on 
the laws of the United States, Germany, Japan, and other countries”). 
14. R. Hewitt Pate, What I Heard in the Great Hall of the People – Realistic Expectations of Chinese 
Antitrust, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 195 (2008).  See also Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 
5, at 212. 
15. Pittman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China:  Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 29 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 465, 486 (2004). 
16. See MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD:  THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND 
THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL Order 582 (2d ed. 2012) (“It would be wrong to assume that [China] 
will behave like the West; that cannot be discounted, but history suggests something different”); 
Thomas Velk, Olivia Gong & Ariel S.N. Zuckerbrot, A Trans-Pacific Partnership, 60(1) ANTITRUST 
BULL. 4, 5 (2015) (“By means of a unique, clearly evident capacity to mix, balance, and then apply 
its own special plays and stratagems, China will evolve into a highly efficient but quite different 
superpower from the United States”); Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 212 
(“China’s long and impressive history and culture, however, ensure that China will do what it has 
done throughout its long history—chart its own course”); JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, 
CHINA:  A NEW HISTORY 164 (2006) (arguing that China’s market economy will “be to a large extent 
in Chinese hands”). 
17. The State Council Info. Office, China, China’s Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of 
Law, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L LAW 513, 514-17 (2008). 
18. See e.g. CCP Document No. 9, April 22, 2013, Communique on the Current State of the Ideological 
Sphere:  A Notice from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s General Office, 
translation available at http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.  
19. AML, Ch. I, art. 1. 
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States “that smoothed the way for Beijing’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization.”20 They also know that they owe a substantial part of their “economic 
miracle” to trade with the West.21  So there is little doubt that the Chinese are likely 
to continue “selectively adapting elements of Western learning and technology to 
China’s needs.”22 
This does not mean, however, that China is likely to follow western Chicago 
School economic theories in interpreting or enforcing its Anti-Monopoly Laws.23  
China is unapologetically basing its current AML enforcement activities and 
decisions on social, political and moral, as well as economic, considerations.24  
“China’s leaders believe that economic and social responsibilities exist together and 
cannot meaningfully be separated.”25  
Whether we like it or not, China’s leaders suspect that many in the West are 
trying “to obscure the essential differences between the West’s value system and the 
value system [the Chinese] advocate, ultimately using the West’s value systems to 
 
20. Andrew Jacobs, The War of Words in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014; see also JACQUES, supra note 
16, at 580 (“As a rising power, [China] has been obliged to converge with and adapt to the existing 
international norms, and in particular to defer to and mollify the present superpower, the United 
States, since the latter’s cooperation and tacit support have been preconditions for China’s wider 
acceptance”). 
21. See e.g., Jacobs, supra note 20. (“[S]ince the 1980s, when the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping urged his 
people to learn from the West in an effort to tackle endemic poverty, Chinese leaders have set aside 
their economic cudgels.  In the decades that followed, Adam Smith-style market economics turned 
former factory workers into millionaires…”); Xiaoye Wang, WTO Accession and the Formulation of 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, in WANG, supra note 13, at 99 (“Entering the WTO in 2001 was a 
milestone for China’s economic reforms.  This significant event not only indicated that the Chinese 
economic system had been generally transformed into a market economy system, but also signified 
China’s increased integration with the rest of the world and the increasing globalization of the 
Chinese economy”). 
22. JONATHON D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 216 (1990).  See also Velk, Gong & 
Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 10 (China “is now undergoing a process through which it may 
amalgamate its natural culture with some of the better social and economic ideas of the west”).  
23. See, e.g., JACQUES, supra note 16, at 563 (arguing that China will continue developing “in very much 
its own way, based on its own history and traditions, which will owe little or nothing to any Western 
inheritance”). 
24. See e.g. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 213 (“China’s future AML 
enforcement is likely to be based on social, moral, and political considerations”); JACQUES, supra 
note 16, 562 (“The reason for China’s transformation . . . has been the way it has succeeded in 
combining what it has learnt from the West, and also its East Asian neighbours, with its own 
history and culture, thereby tapping and releasing its own native sources of dynamism”). 
25. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 213.  See also Geoffrey Kok Heng See, 
Harmonious Society and Chinese CSR:  Is There Really a Link? 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 2 (2009) 
(discussing the CCP’s recognition that it must deal with social and economic issues as an interwoven 
“national priority”); Harmonious Society, The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (Sept. 30, 2007, 9:14 AM), 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/921691/92211/6274973.html, at 1-2 (discussing how 
economic growth in China must be balanced by tackling serious social and economic dislocations). 
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supplant the core values of Socialism.”26  As an example, when China’s President Xi 
Jinping first came to power in October, 2013, he blasted what he characterized as 
western efforts to “denigrate the socialist system– all to promote the Euro-American 
model of capitalism and constitutionalism.”27  President Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, 
similarly warned that “international forces are intensifying the strategic plot of 
Westernizing and dividing China”, and called on his countrymen to “sound the alarm 
and remain vigilant.”28 
China’s leaders consequently are seeking to eschew the teachings and ideologies 
of unrestrained free-market economics that have underpinned the United States’ 
antitrust enforcement efforts since the late 1970s.29  Blasting neoliberalism, China’s 
leaders allege that Western critics “aim to change [China’s] economic infrastructure 
and weaken the government’s control of the national economy.”30  CCP Document 
No. 9, for example, charges:  “They brag on about how we should use Western 
standards to achieve so-called ‘thorough reform.’”31  The harsh rhetoric currently 
coming from China indicates that “[a]fter a lull in xenophobia, anti-Western 
invective [in China] is back.”32 
 
26. Doc. No. 9, supra note 18.  “Document No. 9, as it [is] known, called for eradicating seven subversive 
strains of thinking.  Beginning with ‘Western constitutional democracy.’  The list included press 
freedom, civic participation, ‘universal values’ of human rights, and what it described as ‘nihilist’ 
interpretations of the Party’s history.  The ‘seven taboos’ were delivered to university professors 
and social media celebrities, who were warned not to cross the line.”  EVAN OSNOS, AGE OF 
AMBITION:  CHASING FORTUNE, TRUTH, AND FAITH IN THE NEW CHINA 365-66 (2014). 
27. Id. at 365. 
28. Id. at 319. 
29. For example, CCP Document No. 9 additionally excoriates Western efforts at “promoting 
Neoliberalism, [and] attempting to change China’s basic economic system.”  Doc. No. 9, supra note 
18.  See also Beina Xu & Eleanor Albert, The Chinese Communist Party (Nov. 17, 2014) available 
at http://www.cfr.org/china/chinese-communist-party/p29443; Chris Buckley, China Takes Aim at 
Western Ideas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2013; Noah Feldman, CCP’s Plan for Pro-Democracy Voices:  
Repression, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013; Andrew McKillop, China’s 7 Perils Are All Western, MKT. 
ORACLE, Aug. 20, 2013 (discussing Document No. 9’s criticisms of the doctrines of “free markets” 
and “neo-liberalism”); Stanley Lubman, Document No. 9:  The Party Attacks Western Democratic 
Ideals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2013. 
30. Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at pt 4. The CCP’s Document No. 9 adds: 
Neoliberalism advocates unrestrained economic liberalization, complete privatization, and 
total marketization, and it opposes any kind of interference by the state.  Western 
countries like the United States, carry out their neoliberal agendas under the guise of 
‘globalization,’ visiting catastrophic consequences…[including] the international financial 
crisis from [which] they have yet to recover. 
31. Doc. No. 9, supra, note 18.  The Document continues:  “Essentially they oppose the general and 
specific policies emanating from the road taken at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress 
and they oppose socialism with Chinese characteristics.”  
32. Andrew Jacobs, The War of Words in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014.  See also Murong Xuecan, 
The New Face of China’s Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2013; Orville Schell, Comrade Xi’s 
Choice, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2014, at C1.  (“The party’s strenuous denunciation of such ‘hostile forces’ 
is instructive.  It suggests that our own assumptions over the past few decades – that open markets 
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China’s determination to chart its own antitrust course without following or 
adhering to western ideologies has resulted in four major trends during the first six 
years of AML enforcement.  First, China aspires to protect and buttress its socialist 
market economy by safeguarding what it perceives to be “fair market competition” 
and the “consumer and public interests” of China’s citizens.33  Second, China is 
determined to protect at all costs its own perceived long-term security and economic 
interests.  Third, China is focused on protecting its indigenous business and 
entrepreneurs, including its diverse multitude of small and medium-sized 
businesses.  And, fourth, China is demonstrating a strong propensity to focus on 
potential barriers to entry and the use of exclusionary practices by dominant firms. 
China’s AML enforcement activities have drawn harsh and scathing criticism 
from Western governmental and business interests—especially those in the United 
States.34  Major themes of such criticisms are that China “is relying on non-
competition factors” in its antitrust analyses and enforcement actions, especially in 
the context of international mergers and acquisitions, and the protection of 
Intellectual Property (IP) rights; and that China is discriminating against foreign 
businesses and countries through uneven enforcement of its AML laws.35  “According 
to Lester Ross, Vice Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, this 
is a strategy by the Chinese government to help its domestic companies catch up in 
industries in which they are lagging.”36 
This article first reviews the major emerging trends in China’s current AML 
enforcement efforts, and how they relate to China’s social, political, and economic 
values, culture, and history (Pt. II A-C).  The article then discusses some of the recent 
 
would somehow lead inevitably to open societies and redirect China from what President Bill 
Clinton once called ‘the wrong side of history’—were pipe dreams.”).   
33. AML supra, note 19, at Ch. I, Art. 1. 
34. See, e.g., Velk, Gong & Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 9 (“In 2014, many American and other foreign 
companies claimed that they were singled out in antitrust investigations that discriminated against 
non-Chinese corporations”). 
35. See e.g. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Second Annual GCR 
Live Conference, Antitrust Enforcement in China—What’s Next?  (Sept. 16, 2014), at 3-4 (“…a 
growing chorus is claiming that the Chinese are using the AML to promote industrial policy…[and] 
the AML may be used to protect and promote domestic industry”); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Competing Interests in China’s Competition Law Enforcement, Sept. 9, 2014, at ii (“…China’s 
remedies often appear designed to advance industrial policy and boost national champions, AMEAs 
rely insufficiently on sound economic analysis, intellectual property rights have been curtailed in 
the name of competition law, and AML enforcement suffers from procedural and due process 
shortcomings.  These patterns in AML enforcement give rise to growing concern about the quality 
and fairness of enforcement, and they raise legitimate questions about China’s commitment to the 
global antitrust commons.…”). 
36. Velk, Gong & Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 9.  See also China Targeting Foreign Companies, 
American Chamber Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 2, 2014, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09092/u-s-companies-say-china-subjectively-enforcing-
laws.html. 
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cases, rulings, and investigative activities that highlight China’s growing focus on 
the erection and maintenance of barriers to entry and the employment of 
exclusionary practices by perceived dominant firms (Pt. II. D.).  Part III addresses 
the ongoing criticisms of China’s AML enforcement activities by Western 
governmental and business entities, and whether they are merited or likely to 
catalyze material changes in China’s AML activities. 
II. Current Major Emerging Trends in China’s AML Enforcement 
Efforts 
To understand China’s AML and its recent enforcement efforts, it is “necessary 
and crucial not only to carefully examine the words of the AML, but to read them in 
the context and light of Chinese history, culture, and traditions.”37  First and 
foremost, we must recognize that China may be “the only civilization the world has 
known upon which Western thought exercised little or no influence until modern 
times.”38  “China’s historical culture was largely independent of Western influences 
and its responses to its peoples’ economic needs are often peculiar to China and 
sharply differentiated from other countries.”39 
Second, it is important to keep in mind that China’s political system does not 
share “the same values of the Western legal traditions.”40  China is not in any sense 
“a western-style democracy,”41 and, “in reality, the country still is without rule of 
law.”42  Furthermore, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including 
its President Xi Jinping, are not interested in “bring[ing] about a change of 
 
37. Thomas J. Horton & Jenny Xiaojin Huang, Analyzing Information Exchanges between Competitors 
under the Anti-Monopoly Law, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW:  THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, 95, 98 
(Adrian Emch & David Stallibrass, eds., 2013); See also, Pate, supra note 14, at 211 (“Whether we 
like it or not, Chinese antitrust is going to be different from the U.S. and European varieties.  Close 
attention to the underlying conditions and attitudes that will drive Chinese enforcement will yield 
more insight than comparing the AML with that of the U.S. and European statutes and court 
decisions”); Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China:  Economic Transition, Market 
Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L. 643, 720 (2010) (“…the mold of Western antitrust 
laws takes place under local conditions that are not entirely compatible with Western antitrust 
models…despite having a Western-style antitrust law, China has not developed and likely will not 
develop Western-style antitrust jurisprudence in the near future due to these local conditions”). 
38. NORMAN KOTKER & CHARLES PATRICK FITZGERALD, THE HORIZON HISTORY OF CHINA 10 (Norman 
Kotker, ed., 1969); See also Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 197. 
39. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 197, citing KOTKER & FITZGERALD, supra note 
38, at 11. 
40. Ignazio Castelluci, Rule of Law With Chinese Characteristics, 13 ANN. SURV. INT’L L. & COMP. L. 35, 
64 (2007).  See also Horton & Huang, supra note 37, at 98. 
41. See Horton, Confucianism & Antitrust, supra note 5, at 197. 
42. Velk, Gong & Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 8.  The authors add:  “China does not have an 
independent judiciary that acts as a check on executive power . . . Constitutionally prescribed limits 
on the sovereign power of the Communist party are mere rhetorical devices.”   
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allegiance by bringing Western political systems to China.”43  Indeed, one of the 
CCP’s conspicuous slogans is “A strong Communist Party means happiness to the 
Chinese people.”44  CCP Document No. 9 warns Chinese leaders that one of the goals 
of the West “is to obscure the essential differences between the West’s value system 
and the value system we advocate, ultimately using the West’s value systems to 
supplant the core values of Socialism.”45 
A key concern of the CCP is “to maintain social stability, which ensures the CCP 
stays in power.”46  As an authoritarian single-party regime, the CCP believes it must 
“reinforce [its] management of all types and levels of propaganda on the cultural 
front, perfect and carry out related administrative systems, and allow absolutely no 
opportunity or outlets for incorrect thinking or viewpoints to spread.”47  In simple 
terms, China’s AML and the authorities that interpret and enforce it ultimately are 
beholden to the CCP and its “Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation” through the continuing development and implementation of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.”48  Therefore, China’s AML enforcement activities 
ultimately are not directed towards carrying out or reinforcing western neoclassical 
economic ideologies, but towards helping “to perfect a Socialist rule of law system 
with Chinese characteristics.”49 
A. China Aspires To Protect Its Socialist Market Economy By 
Safeguarding What It Perceives to Be “Fair Market Competition” 
And The “Consumer and Public Interests” Of Its Citizens 
In Article 1 of Chapter 1, China’s AML sets out its broad goals of “preventing and 
prohibiting monopolistic conduct, safeguarding fair market competition, improving 
the efficiency of economic operation, protecting the consumer and public interests, 
and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy.”50  Article 
 
43. Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at 3. 
44. Xuecan, supra note 32. 
45. Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at 3. 
46. Monthly Analysis of U.S. – China Trade Data, Report by the U.S. – China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, Nov. 4, 2014, at 5.  The USCC Report further characterizes the CCP as 
“remain[ing] above the law.”  Id.  See also The Right Honourable Brian Mulroacy, The Growth of a 
Giant, 60(1) ANTITRUST BULL. 14, 16 (2015) (arguing that in China there is no “serious consideration 
of whether China should be open to options beyond a single-party control vehicle or, indeed, whether 
more clarity needs to be brought to such fundamental issues as whether the party is (according to 
most current interpretations) above the law or subject to it”). 
47. Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at p. 7.  See also Monthly Analysis, supra note 40, at 5 (“The government 
is well aware of the need to maintain the public’s trust in the system”). 
48. Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at 2.  Indeed, the CPC has gone so far as to pronounce that Chinese 
television should be dedicated to promoting “socialist core values.”  OSNOS, supra note 26, at 320. 
49. See President Xi’s Plenum Speech Emphasizes the Law, CHINESE MEDIA DIG., Nov. 10, 2014, at 2. 
50. AML Ch. 1, Art. 1. See note 11 
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4 adds that “The State shall formulate and implement competition rules compatible 
with the socialist market economy, perfect macroeconomic supervision, and develop 
a united, open, competitive and orderly market system.”51 
From the outset, China’s AML is ambiguous, and includes both industrial and 
competition policies.52  As noted by distinguished Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 
Professor Xiaoye Wang, “[b]ecause consumer interests and the public interest may 
not be parallel, it may still be difficult for the anti-monopoly authority to make a 
choice.”53  What is not ambiguous, however, is the CCP’s determination that the 
public interest “is a critical part of the law,”54 and that China’s AML is seen as part 
of the State’s control over an orderly market system designed to promote the healthy 
development of China’s socialist market economy, and “the universal good of the 
Chinese people.”55 
As China moves forward into its eighth year of AML enforcement, it is becoming 
clear that China has not accepted western competition policy as a normative 
organizing principle.56  Current United States Federal Trade Commissioner 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen believes that in spite of the rhetoric about China wanting to 
move “away from a planned economy and toward a market system,” there is still a 
strong “continuing impulse to factor in effects on Chinese industry and employment 
rather than focusing simply on efficiency and consumer welfare, as well as ongoing 
support for more direct government intervention in the market.”57  Such interests 
are seen as important in “building a harmonious socialist society,” and in promoting 
“the prosperity of the nation, and the vitality and happiness of the Chinese people.”58 
All this points to China’s emerging intent to be “guided by social, moral, and 
 
51. AML Ch. I, Art. 4.  See also Susan Beth Farmer The Impact of China’s Antitrust Law and Other 
Competition Policies on U.S. Companies, 23 LOY. CONS. L. REV. 34, 42-43, 45 (2010) (discussing how 
“AML Articles 1 and 4 diverge from the traditional model of antitrust analysis that is based solely 
on competition principles”).  
52. See e.g. WANG, supra note 13, at 322-23. 
53. Id. at 323. 
54. Id. at 322. 
55. Id. at 323. 
56. Impact of China’s Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies on U.S. Companies:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 7 (July 13, 2010) (testimony of Shankar A. Singham); See also Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 
Illuminating the Story of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 4 (Oct. 2013) available 
at: www.antitrustsource.com (observing that during a July 31-August 1, 2013, celebration of the 
fifth anniversary of China’s AML, Chinese “antitrust officials were more mixed in their 
endorsement of free-market competition, with several officials emphasizing the need for 
maintaining regular market order”). 
57. Ohlhausen, supra note 35, at 8.  See also Farmer, supra note 52, at 45 (discussing how the AML 
allows consideration of effects on “social public interests and economic development”). 
58. WANG, supra note 13, at 21, quoting CCP’s Central Committee’s October 11, 2006, Decisions 
Regarding Several Major Issues With Building a Harmonious Society. 
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ethical considerations” in interpreting and enforcing its AML.59  A key objective 
includes “preserving and protecting China’s traditional cultural and historical 
values,”60 including Chinese Confucianism.61  China is determined to regulate 
competitive behavior it deems to be ethically and socially irresponsible.62  China is 
therefore focused on maintaining fair and orderly competition, which “assumes a 
harmonious business relationship between competitors, as well as suppliers, 
customers, and partners.”63  We should not therefore be surprised to see an emphasis 
on encouraging fair competition, preventing unfair competition practices, and 
protecting the legal rights and interests of business operators, as well as Chinese 
consumers.64 
Recent Chinese administrative rulings and guidelines, as well as court decisions, 
point in this direction.  For example, on August 23, 2014, China’s State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC),65 issued the Interim Regulation 
on the Disclosure of Enterprise Information, which took effect on October 1, 2014.  
SAIC’s Guidelines emphasize that enterprise information disclosure is designed to 
ensure fair market competition, and to promote integrity and self-discipline among 
 
59. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 196. 
60. Id. at 199. 
61. Id. at 205; see also JACQUES, supra note 16, at 565 (“The [Chinese] state remains as pivotal in society 
and sacrosanct as it was in imperial times.  Confucius, its great architect, is in the process of 
experiencing a revival and his precepts still, in important measure, inform the way China thinks 
and behaves.  Although there are important differences between the Confucian and Communist 
eras, there are also strong similarities”). 
62. See e.g., Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 209; William E. Shafer, Kyoko 
Fukukawa & Grace Meina Lee, Values and the Perceived Importance of Ethics and Social 
Responsibility:  The U.S. Versus China, 70 J. BUS. ETHICS 265, 268 (2007) (discussing how many 
Chinese fear that “the transition to a market-based economy has been characterized by behavior 
that is less than ethical and socially irresponsible”); SPENCE, supra note 22, at 699 (1990) 
(discussing China’s longstanding fear of decadent Western influences, including “spiritual 
pollution”). 
63. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 214.  See also Lei Wang & Heikki Juslin, The 
Impact of Chinese Culture on Corporate Social Responsibility:  The Harmony Approach, 88 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 433, 443-44 (2009). 
64. See e.g., Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 217. 
65. China’s SAIC “is a ministerial-level entity, directly under the State Council, charged with 
supervision and regulation of the markets and protecting the rights of businesses and consumers.  
It has responsibility for administering numerous commercial regulations, ranging from business 
and trademark registration, consumer protection, and trademark registration, to street market 
regulation.” HARRIS, ET AL., supra note 12, at 273.  SAIC is responsible for “handling anticompetitive 
conduct that has a major national impact or other monopolistic practices that it may find within its 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 274.  See also Yang Jie, SAIC’s Antitrust Enforcement Practice:  The Progress 
Made in the Past Five Years, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 9, at 377 (SAIC “is 
responsible for antitrust enforcement that is not related to anti-competitive pricing practices and 
merger control.  In particular, it is responsible for enforcement against monopoly agreements, 
abuses of a dominant market position and abuses of administrative powers to eliminate or restrict 
competition”); WANG, supra note 13, at 408-9 (discussing “antitrust enforcement by SAIC”). 
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market participants, while also expending “social supervision.”66  Terms such as 
“guarantee[ing] fair competition” and “promot[ing] the integrity and self discipline 
of enterprises” highlight China’s focus on social, moral, and ethical considerations in 
market competition.67 
Similar terms have been employed in recent anti-monopoly investigations and 
announcements by China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC).68  For example, on September 26, 2014, the NDRC announced an 
administrative monopoly investigation of the Hebei Provincial Government’s 
Transport Department, Price Bureau, and Finance Department.69  The NDRC 
struck down a preferential toll policy that favored Hebei transport businesses over 
their out-of-province competitors.  The NDRC “found that the policy harmed fair 
competition and constituted an abuse of administrative power in breach of Article 8 
of the AML.”70  Thus, the NDRC sent a strong message that local governmental 
officials should work to ensure fair competition and an orderly market within their 
borders.71   
Similarly, China’s courts have recently focused on “unfair competition” issues.  
For example, on September 22, 2014, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court 
ruled that Kingsoft, a Chinese internet company, had engaged in unfair competition 
by using an advertisement filter to block the video ads of Youku, one of China’s 
largest online video-sharing companies.72  The Court’s ruling is consistent with 
 
66. Interim Regulation on Enterprise Information Disclosure (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 
7, 2014, effective Oct. 1, 2014) (P.R.C.)).  Article 1, for example, states:  “This Regulation is 
formulated to guarantee fair competition, promote the integrity and self-discipline enterprises, 
regulate enterprise information disclosure, intensify enterprise credit restraint, maintain 
transaction safety, improve the effectiveness of government regulation, and expand social 
supervision.”  Id. at Art. 1. 
67. Similarly, China’s government procurement system is to be based on the “principles of openness 
and transparency, fair competition, impartiality, and good faith.”  CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 1 
(25th ed. 2013); China’s Rules on Retailing Fees were promulgated “for the purpose of maintaining 
market order and fair trading and promoting the healthy development of the retail industry.” CHINA 
COMPETITION BULL. 2 (17th ed. 2012).  
68. China’s NDRC “is a ministerial-level entity directly under the State Council.  It is charged with the 
formulation and implementation of national economic and development policies.”  The NDRC “also 
enforces [China’s] Price Law, which prohibits certain ‘unfair pricing behaviors,’ including price-
fixing, predatory pricing, price discrimination, and deceptive pricing.” HARRIS, ET AL., supra note 
12, at 277.  See also WANG, supra note 13, at 407-08 (discussing “antitrust enforcement by the 
NDRC”). 
69. NDRC Investigates Administrative Monopoly in Hebei Province, in CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 3 
(34th ed. 2014), NDRC opinion available at 
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201409/t20140926_626773.html.  
70. Id. 
71. “Reports indicate[d] that the NDRC investigation was initiated in response to a complaint by the 
South Korean embassy, which passed on a complaint by a Chinese-Korean company in Tianjin who 
was unable to take advantage of the [toll] discount[s].”  Id. 
72. Beijing Court Rules Against Kingsoft in Unfair Competition Case, in CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 5 
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China’s Internet Information Service Rules, which prohibit Internet information 
services from engaging in conduct that may damage the legal rights of their 
competitors and consumers.73 
China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) also repeatedly and consistently has 
emphasized that intellectual property and patents must be licensed on “fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms” in allowing various mergers and 
acquisitions to proceed.  For example, in its 2012 conditional approval of Google’s 
acquisition of Motorola Mobility, MOFCOM required that “Google must honor 
Motorola Mobility’s existing commitment to license its patents on fair, reasonable, 
and non-discriminatory terms.”74  Similarly, in Microsoft’s 2014 acquisition of 
Nokia’s devices and services business, MOFCOM required Microsoft to make 
various licenses committed to industry standards available on fair, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory terms (“FRAND”); and to offer fair royalty rates and conditions 
for patents not committed to any industry standard.75 
MOFCOM has employed similar remedies requiring fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory behavior in supplying various products to Chinese businesses post-
merger.  For example, in the 2013 Glencore/Xstrata merger, MOFCOM imposed 
requirements that for a period of eight years, Glencore has to supply certain volumes 
of copper, zinc and lead concentrates to Chinese customers with prices and other 
conditions that are fair, reasonable, and consistent with the then prevailing terms 
used in the international market.76  Likewise, in the General Motors/Delphi 
 
(34th ed. 2014); opinion available at 
http://bj1zy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/09/id/1449430.shtml.  
73. See e.g. CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 1 (12th ed. 2011) (“The draft Internet Information Services 
Rules contain 22 articles and prohibit Internet information services from engaging in conduct that 
may damage the legal rights of their competitors and consumers.”); CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 1 
(8th ed. 2011) (discussing how China’s Service Codes for E-Commerce Third Party Transaction 
Platforms forbid “imped[ing] the legitimate interests of other business operators and consumers”). 
74. CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4-5 (20th ed. 2012). 
75. CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 3-4 (31st ed. 2014); and 
http://fidj/mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201404/20140400542415.shtml; and 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/slfw/201404/2014040054254.shtml. It is especially interesting 
to note that MOFCOM required such conditions after the deal was unconditionally approved by a 
number of leading international enforcement authorities, including those of the United States and 
the European Union. Id.  MOFCOM has been the only major competition authority to impose 
restrictive conditions in a number of other deals that have been approved unconditionally by 
authorities in the United States, Europe and Japan, including:  Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite 
International (MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 28, April 24, 2009); General Motors/Delphi (MOFCOM 
Publ. Ann. No. 76, Sept. 28, 2009); Seagate/Samsung (MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 90, Dec. 12, 2011); 
and Google/Motorola Mobility (MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 25, May 19, 2012).  See HARRIS, ET AL., 
supra note 12, at 38.  Furthermore, MOFCOM has not been afraid to impose “remedies that were 
different to or went beyond those required by other jurisdictions,” for example in the 
InBev/Anheuser Busch [MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 95, Nov. 18, 2008] and Western Digital/Hitachi 
transactions.  Id. at 38-39. 
76. Merger Update—MOFCOM Approval and Management Update, Glencore International p/c News 
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Corporation merger in 2009, MOFCOM required that GM would “continue with its 
principle of multiple sourcing and nondiscrimination with respect to all auto parts, 
and to conduct nondiscriminatory procurement…, and not to specially formulate any 
unreasonable conditions favorable toward Delphi but unfavorable toward other 
suppliers.”77 
Taken together, these rulings and statements confirm China’s belief that fair 
market competition at all levels is crucial to “protecting the consumer and public 
interests, [and] promoting the healthy development of the socialist market 
economy.”78  Such judicial and administrative rulings and statements are consistent 
with and advance the CCP’s own pronouncements that “fairness and justice” are 
crucial keys to a successful socialist economy and country.79  It is important to keep 
in mind that “Confucian morality traditionally has decried selfishness and greed ‘as 
an antisocial evil.’”80  Fears and concerns with “the social evils of unbridled 
capitalism and extreme individualism in the West”81 are therefore likely to continue 
the push for implementing antitrust policies “that ensure all market participants 
have a level competitive field.”82 
One substantive area in which China’s focus on fairness appears to be leading to 
dramatic substantive differences is in resale price maintenance (RPM).  In contrast 
to antitrust enforcers in the United States, China’s AML enforcement authorities 
have paid special attention in the last several years to potential resale price 
maintenance (RPM) policies and activities.83  For example, on February 23, 2013, 
China’s NDRC “fined two Chinese state-owned liquor manufacturers through its 
 
Release (April 16, 2013), at 2. 
77. MOFCOM Announcement [2009] No. 76 (Sept. 28, 2009), at pt. 7. 
78. AML Ch. I, Art. 1. 
79. See e.g., The State Council Info. Office, China, China’s Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the 
Rule of Law, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L LAW (2008).  The government listed “fairness and justice [as critical 
to China’s future]”, as well as “safeguarding market  order and achieving social fairness and justice 
[in] establish[ing] an initial law regime for the socialist market economy.”  Id. at 514, 517; see also 
Chinese Scholars Debate Rule of Law and Economy, supra note 44, at 3 (observing that “a market 
economy governed by law must fulfill three basic requirements:  the law must command the highest 
authority; uphold fundamental principles like fairness and justice, with protection of rights at its 
core; and develop in harmony with the economy and society…[and] Chinese society must share the 
values of a ‘market economy governed by law,’ including freedom, equality, fairness, and trust”). 
80. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 216, quoting FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra 
note 16, at 258-59. 
81. See SPENCE, supra note 22, at 17. 
82. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 216, quoting Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu, 
Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance:  Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms, 119 ECON. J. 
764, 794 (2009). 
83. See e.g. Shan Jiang & D. Daniel Sokol, Resale Price Maintenance in China:  An Economic 
Perspective, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (forthcoming 2015), available at SSRN, at  i138 
(“Administrative enforcement of RPM has been a significant priority in recent years”); Dennis Lu 
& Guofu Tan, Resale Price Maintenance and the Anti-Monopoly Law, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY 
LAW, supra note 9, at 119. 
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local authorities for restricting competition and harming consumers by using 
minimum RPM in their distribution agreements.”84  Six months later, on August 7, 
2013, NDRC fined Biostime and five other infant formula makers for enforcing RPM 
in various forms, “including fixing the prices of commodities resold to a third party 
or restricting the minimum prices for commodities resold to a third party….”85   
More recently, NDRC enforcement investigations and fines have been targeted 
towards major foreign eyeglass manufacturers,86 as well as foreign automobile 
companies, including Mercedes Benz, Audi, Volkswagen, and Chrysler.87  For 
example, on April 23, 2015, the Jiangsu Price Bureau (the NRDC’s local Jiangsu 
Province counterpart) fined Mercedes Benz RMB 350 million and several of its local 
dealers a total of RMB 7.9 million for implementing resale price maintenance 
through checks, warnings, and penalties such as reducing policy support.88The 
increasing crackdowns against RPM by foreign companies in China has led some 
commentators to ask whether the NDRC considers RPM to be an essentially per se 
violation.89  There is little doubt that RPM in China will continue to be a hot issue. 
B. China Is Determined To Protect And Enhance Its Own Perceived 
Long-Term Security and Economic Interests 
China’s AML expressly sets forth China’s strong interest in protecting and 
enhancing China’s national and economic security.90  Article 31 of the AML requires 
 
84. Lu & Tan, supra note 83, at 127. 
85. Jiang & Sokol, supra note 83, at 9.  
86. See e.g. Jiang & Sokol, supra note 83, at 10, and NDRC Fines Lens Manufacturers for Vertical Price-
Fixing, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 6 (32nd ed. 2014).  The NDRC imposed aggregate fines in excess 
of RMB 19 million against a number of large foreign eyeglass and contact lens manufacturers, 
including Essior, Nikon, Carl Zeiss, Johnson & Johnson, and Bausch & Lomb.  Interestingly, two 
key Chinese companies, Hoya and Shanghai Weicon Optical “were exempt from penalties as they 
reported the anti-competitive conduct and provided important evidence to the NDRC.”  Id. 
87. See e.g. FAW-Volkswagen and Audi Dealers Fined in Hubei Province for Resale Price Maintenance 
and Price Fixing, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 2 (34th ed. 2014); Shanghai Price Bureau Sanctions 
Chrysler and Chrysler Dealers for Resale Price Maintenance and Price Fixing.  Id. at 3. 
88. See The NRDC imposed a find of RMB 350 million on Mercedes Benz and over RMB 7 million on 
local dealers, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 3 (36th ed. 2015), citing 
http://www.jswjj.gov.cn/office_new/eo_comm_zxnrxs.php. 
89. For example, a January 14, 2015, CLE webinar brochure advertised that:  “Crackdowns are 
increasing in China against alleged RPM practices by foreign and domestic companies.  The 
[NDRC]…appears to consider resale price maintenance to be a per se violation of the law.”  
Strafford, Intensified Resale Price Maintenance Enforcement in China, the EU and the US:  
Mitigating Antitrust Risk, Jan. 14, 2015, available at 
https://www.straffordpub.com/products/intensified-resale-price-maintenance....; See also 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Resale Price Maintenance:  Is it ‘per se’ illegal in China?, Feb. 6, 
2013 (copy of memorandum on file with author).  But see Jiang & Sokol, supra note 83 (arguing that 
China should pursue a “prohibition plus exemption” enforcement model that analyses economic and 
competitive effects factors). 
90. See e.g. Farmer, supra note 51, at 36-37 (“In another departure from American antitrust policy, the 
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mergers or acquisitions involving foreign companies or investors “which implicate 
national security” to “go through national security reviews according to relevant 
laws and regulations.”91  AML Article 27 additionally requires China’s competition 
authorities to review “the effect of [a] concentration on national economic 
development,” as well as “[o]ther factors affecting market competition as determined 
by the AMEA [Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authorities].”92 
AML Articles 27 and 31 mesh with Article 1’s broad goals of “promoting the 
healthy development of the socialist market economy” and AML Article 4’s 
admonition that “[T]he State shall formulate and implement competition rules 
compatible with the socialist market economy, perfect macroeconomic supervision 
and control, and develop a united, open, competitive and orderly market system.”93  
Together, these articles provide strong incentives to China’s AML authorities to 
regulate business conduct that “would not only impede competition but also harm 
Chinese national security [and economic interests].”94 
These AML provisions further reflect long-standing Chinese concerns and 
internal debates “regarding the perceived national security issues arising from 
foreign acquisitions of domestic [Chinese] companies, with particular concern 
focused on ‘strategic and sensitive’ industries and Chinese national champions.”95  It 
is difficult for Westerners to fully appreciate China’s intense security concerns based 
on the horrific and “long history of destructive imperialism in China, which has led 
to ‘social disruption and psychological demoralization,’ and, at times, threatened 
China’s ‘entire way of life.’”96  But such concerns remain powerful throughout China 
 
Chinese antitrust law explicitly incorporates additional, non-competition factors into the 
analysis…The agency guidelines and language of the available decisions employ mainstream 
analytic concepts, but also may import non-economic factors such as ‘national economic 
development’ and ‘national security’ in mergers involving foreign investors.” 
91. AML Ch. IV, Art. 31. 
92. AML Ch. IV, Art. 27.  See also Ohlhausen, Illuminating, supra note 35, at 6 (discussing how AML 
Article 27 expressly allows for consideration of broad factors that are inconsistent “with market 
competition analysis . . . [including] the effect of the proposed deal on the development of the 
national economy, and any other factors determined by the State Council Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement Authority”). 
93. AML Ch. I, Art. 4. 
94. WANG, supra note 13, at 320. 
95. HARRIS ET. AL., supra note 12, at 134, quoting NDRC, Special Review Mechanism Needs to be 
Established for Mergers and Acquisitions Involving Foreign Parties, Dec. 27, 2006.  See also MARK 
FURSE, ANTITRUST LAW IN CHINA, KOREA AND VIETNAM 107 (2009).  In all fairness, it must be noted 
that in the United States and Canada, serious concerns about China using investments in western 
companies and technology for military and strategic purposes have led to increasing careful 
monitoring and review in both countries of Chinese investments and acquisitions.  See, e.g., 
Nicholas Raffin & Eric Wiebe, A Timeline of the East-West Relationship:  Past, Present, and Future 
Acquisitions, 60(1) ANTITRUST BULL. 19 (2015).  Indeed, the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS) “applied mitigation measures to sixteen cases from 2008 to 2010.”  Id. 
at 28. 
96. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 199-200, citing FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra 
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today.  As recently noted by the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review 
Commission in its November 2014 Report to Congress:  “Published Chinese views 
on China-Japan security relations encompass a mix of suspicion, alarm, and 
concern—especially on the issues of Japan’s increasing robust defense and security 
establishment, the development of the U.S.—Japan alliance, and perceived lack of 
Japanese atonement over its wartime past.”97   
Alarmingly, China has increasingly begun leveraging its economic successes into 
a major military build-up.  For example, the U.S.-China Economic Security Review 
Commission (USCC) Report adds:  “China is engaged in a sustained and substantial 
military buildup that is shifting the balance of power in the region, and is using its 
growing military advantages to support its drive for a dominant sphere of influence 
in East Asia.”98  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has raised 
particular concerns over China’s naval build-up, which has “served to crystallize the 
doubts and fears about China’s long-term intentions.”99 
Some commentators have sought to argue that China’s intense focus on protecting 
its own economic security partially could be a result of “the national security hurdles 
encountered by Chinese companies overseas….”100 Indeed, China appears to have 
modelled its AML security provisions on United States’ regulations that were used 
to block foreign purchases in the United States based “on purported national 
security grounds.”101  In any event, it seems likely that security concerns on both 
 
note 16, at 189.  As described by Fairbank and Goldman, “[t]oday’s historians are more likely to 
stress the social disruption and psychological demoralization caused by foreign imperialism.  In 
these dimensions the long-term foreign invasion[s] of China proved to be a disaster so 
comprehensive and appalling that we are still incapable of fully describing it.”  Id.  See also RANA 
MITTER, FORGOTTEN ALLY:  CHINA’S WORLD WAR II – 1937-1945 (2013) (describing in detail the 
horrors of Japanese atrocities in WWII); MICHAEL BURLEIGH, MORAL COMBAT:  GOOD AND EVIL IN 
WWII 14-21 (2011) (describing Japan’s horrific invasion of China and the barbaric slaughter and 
torture of Chinese civilians and soldiers); IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING:  THE FORGOTTEN 
HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR II (1997) (describing the horrors of Japan’s invasion of China during 
World War II). 
97. USCC 2014 Report to Congress, Competing Interests, supra note 35, at 21. 
98. Id. at 22. 
99. JACQUES, supra note 16, at 591.  Jacques adds:  “It would seem that the Chinese government made 
little or no attempt to inform, let alone consult, its ASEAN partners about the new naval 
deployments.”  Id. 
100. HARRIS, ET. AL., supra note 12, at 134. 
101. Id. Indeed, AML Article 31 “was formulated after CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal in 2005 
in the United States, which failed in the face of heavy opposition on national security and other 
grounds.”  Id. at 134, n. 36.  See also Michael Petrusie, Recent Development Oil and the National 
Security:  CNOOC’s Failed Bid to Purchase UNOCAL, 84 N. CAR. L. REV. 1373 (2006).  Professor 
Xiaoye Wang perceptively adds that China’s AML security provision “is not unlike the United 
States, United States’ Exon-Florio merger review of certain foreign investments involving national 
security.”  WANG, supra note 13, at 320-21, citing 50 U.S.C.A §2170.  See also Moritz Lorentz, The 
New Chinese Competition Act, 29 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 257, 261 (2008); Nathan Bush & Zhou 
Zhaofeng, Chinese Antitrust—Act II, Scene I, 8(1) THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 9 (2008); Raffin & 
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sides will increasingly impact economic relations between China and the west.102 
A potential complicating factor in attempting to predict how boldly China will 
apply security concerns in its interpretation and enforcement of its AML is that the 
term “national security” conceivably could be defined broadly and “used to promote 
domestic [Chinese] economic protectionism.”103  Indeed, MOFCOM’s 2011 
implementing regulations broadly cover military or military-related enterprises 
surrounding a key or sensitive military infrastructure or unit otherwise related to 
the military; and national security-related enterprises regarding important 
agricultural and energy products and resources, as well as important infrastructure, 
transportation, technology and major equipment manufacturing.104  Potential 
factors to be considered include the influence of potential transactions over China’s 
national defense, the stable running of China’s economy, China’s basic social life and 
order, and research and development of key national security technologies.105  The 
potential practical breadth of these national security concerns is enormous, and 
highlights China’s obsession with protecting its national security interests against 
foreign investments.  Therefore, it is likely that national security concerns will play 
a crucial role in China’s AML review of the activities of foreign companies and 
investors in China in the coming years. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, China’s AML specifically identifies the 
protecting of “the public interest and the impact on the Chinese national economy” 
as key goals and objectives.106  Once again, such considerations in the context of 
industrial conduct and transactions, including mergers and acquisitions, “is a very 
 
Wiebe, supra note 96, at 35-37 (discussing increasing American and Canadian hostility to Chinese 
investments that could confer strategic military advantages). 
102. See, e.g., CAPITOL FORUM, May 12, 2015, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law:  An Interview with Professor 
Tom Horton of USD Law (on file with author). 
103. Competition Policy in China, Report by the U.S.—China Business Council, Sept. 2014, at 13.  See 
also Hannah C. L. Ho, China’s Security Review System for Foreign Investment:  Where Do We 
Stand?, MONDAQ (April 7, 2014) (discussing the possibility of overbroad interpretations of sensitive 
or key competitive areas); Christine Kahler, Foreign M & A in China Face Security Review, CHINA 
BUS. REV. (April 1, 2011) (observing that “the security review will analyze the M & A deal’s effects 
on national security, China’s economy, social stability, and the R & D capabilities of key national 
security technologies.  Transactions found to have ‘significant effects on national security’ will be 
terminated or approved conditionally”). 
104. MOFCOM Regulation on Implementing the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions 
of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, of September 1, 2011.  See also McDermott, Will & 
Emery, China Formalises National Security Review System for M & A Transactions by Foreign 
Firms, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/china-formalises-national-security-
review-system-ma-transactions-foreign-investors. See also JANE M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW 
DESKBOOK:  A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN INVESTED BUSINESSES 930, n. 114 (3d ed. 2010). 
105. Id. 
106. Gregory K. Leonard & Yizhe Zhang, Considering the Unique Aspects of the Merger Review Process 
in China, ANTITRUST SOURCE, 1 (2014).  See also AML, Ch. I, Arts. 1 & 4. 
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broad concept.”107  Combined with the “insufficient independence” for antitrust 
enforcement authorities in China,108 such broad economic policy goals for antitrust 
create potential vulnerabilities for “officials at MOFCOM, NDRC, and SAIC, [who] 
are part of larger organizations whose functions include the formulation and 
implementation of macroeconomic and other policies.”109 
There should be little doubt that broad macroeconomic concerns are given priority 
over competition concerns in China today.  For example, in 2014, China’s “Party 
leaders placed their highest priority on maintaining public support through rapid 
economic growth and job creation.”110  As a result, some commentators argue that 
“[d]uring the course of 2014, foreign companies investing in China faced increased 
regulatory burdens and barriers to business dealings that do not similarly encumber 
China’s highly favored ‘national champions.’”111  Throughout 2014, “China used [its] 
AML to investigate foreign firms in sectors designated by the government as 
‘strategic and emerging,’ including automobiles and information technology.”112  
Such developments reveal a continuing intention to heavily factor in perceived 
effects on Chinese industry and employment. 
China’s President Xi Jinping announced at China’s 2013 Third Plenum that 
reforms were important, but the state would continue to play a key role in the 
economy.113  Such pronouncements are more than rhetoric.  CCP Document No. 9 
confirms that such speeches are designed to “unif[y] the thought of the entire Party, 
the entire country, and the people enormously.”114  Combined with the CCP’s 
promises to “accelerate[e] economic transformation as the main thread, and 
increas[e] the quality and efficiency of the economy at its core,”115 it is likely that 
protecting and enhancing China’s perceived long-term security and economic 
interests will play a key role in China’s future interpretation and enforcement of its 
 
107. Xiaoye Wang & Adrian Emch, Five Years of Implementation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law—
Achievements and Challenges, 2013 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 1, 23 (2013). 
108. Id. at 21-22. 
109. Id. at 22. 
110. U.S.—CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra 
note 46, at 33. 
111. Id. at 34.  Furthermore, “[f]or the first time, in 2014, foreign direct investment (FDI) from China 
into the United States exceeded FDI from the United States to China.”  Id. 
112. U.S. –CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW, supra note 40, at 60.  The European Union 
Chamber of Commerce has emphasized similar concerns.  See Michael Martina, EU Lobby Piles in 
on Foreign Criticism of China’s Antitrust Enforcement, REUTERS, Sept. 9, 2014. 
113. China’s Third Plenum:  Xi Jinping consolidates Power, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2013, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1044176/Chinas-Third-Plenum.  (“The free 
market, [the conference statement] said, would be given a ‘decisive role in allocating resources,’ but 
the Communist party will continue to shape the economic landscape”). 
114.  Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at 2. 
115. Id. 
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AML.116  As observed by AML scholar Wendy Ng, “[w]here an important or sensitive 
Chinese industry is involved, it appears that MOFCOM might be more concerned 
about the potential negative effects of the transaction on the industry and national 
economic development more generally.”117 
C.   China Is Further Focused On Protecting Its Indigenous 
Businesses and Entrepreneurs, Including Its Diverse Multitude Of 
Small And Medium-Sized Businesses 
Although China’s economy is plagued today by the continuing existence of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs),118 China has a strong backbone of small and medium-
size businesses, sometimes referred to as “a fast-growing thicket of bamboo 
capitalism.”119  This “astonishing force” of private entrepreneurs is a crucial 
contributor to economic innovation and growth in China.120  Not surprisingly, “China 
continues to show a keen interest in protecting the long-term health and economic 
opportunities of [these] smaller competitors.”121  Encouraging small businesses and 
 
116. Id. at 46.  Brookings Institution scholar Arthur Kroeber adds that “[t]he respective roles of state 
and market need to be clarified, but the state role will remain very large.”  Arthur Kroeber, After 
the NPC:  Xi Jinping’s Roadmap for China, (Brookings Instit.), March 11, 2014, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/11-after-npc-xi-jinping-roadmap-for-china-
kroeber.  Moreover, the IMF observed in a 2014 report on China that its economic reform blueprint 
“has not been followed up with details on the specific reforms or timetables.”  Id. 
117. Wendy Ng, Policy Objectives of Public Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law:  The First Five Years, 
in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 9, at 35, 44.  Interestingly, “the involvement of a well-
known Chinese brand appears to be an [additional potential] important factor in MOFCOM’s 
decision-making.”  Id. at 45.  See also Wang & Emch, supra note 107, at 22 (“An important weakness 
of the three antitrust authorities is that they are inserted within larger ministries or commissions 
under the State Council.  In other words, their level in the Chinese hierarchy is not high enough for 
enforcing the AML in an entirely independent and ‘neutral’ manner”). 
118. A wealth of excellent scholarship discussing economic issues relating to China’s SOEs is available.  
For example, Professor Xiaoye Wang observes:  “State-owned enterprises face the biggest problems 
in China’s current economic reforms…Currently, the key to China’s economic reform is the reform 
of state-owned enterprises, and promoting competition and breaking up monopolies are the keys to 
turning the state-owned enterprises into legal person.”  WANG, supra note 10, at 151.  See also id. 
at 138-39 (“Based on primarily historical and structural reasons, China should concentrate its 
current anti-monopoly effects on state-owned enterprises”); Thomas Brook, China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law:  History, Application, and Enforcement, 16 APPEAL 31, 38 (2011) (“SOEs have retained 
significant if not strengthened control of many industries despite attempts by the Chinese 
government to introduce competition”).  A fuller discussion of China’s SOEs and ongoing reform 
efforts by China is beyond the scope of this article. 
119. Wesley Harris, China Energy:  A Crossroads Historiography, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 255, 259 
(2012), quoting China’s Economy:  Bamboo Capitalism, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18332610. 
120. Id. at 258-59.  See also JACQUES, supra note 16, at 621 (arguing that “a major reason why the 
Chinese economy has been so dynamic is the intense competition between the various provinces 
and their firms”). 
121. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 225.  See also Thomas J. Horton & Jenny 
Xiaojin Huang, Analyzing Information Exchanges between Competitors un the Anti-Monopoly Law, 
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entrepreneurs is viewed as a key part of China’s efforts to promote “the healthy 
development of the socialist market economy.”122 
China sees the protection of small and medium-size competitors and producers in 
a competitive market as beneficial in several key ways.123  First, their continuing 
presence “allows local producers to participate in an evolving and innovative market, 
thereby increasing the possibility of capturing technological expansions.”124  They 
also help fuel China’s economic growth and promote its long-term economic 
stability.125 
China’s AML unapologetically sets forth China’s interest in protecting its small 
businesses’ competitive opportunities.  For example, AML Article 15 (3) sets forth 
the express objective of “improving operational efficiency and enhancing the 
competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises.”126  AML Articles 1 and 4 
bolster and buttress this clear objective by seeking to “safeguard[ ] fair market 
competition” and by “develop[ing] a united, open, competitive and orderly market 
system.”127  Similarly, Article 6 forbids dominant undertakings from abusing their 
market positions “to eliminate or restrict competition.”128  Such provisions have led 
some scholars to raise the “worrisome possibility” that “the drafters intended the 
AML as a tool to promote [China’s] domestic economy….”129 
In interpreting and carrying out these mandates, China’s AML regulators 
unapologetically have sought to limit activities or transactions that could have an 
adverse impact on domestic small and medium-size businesses.  For example, at a 
 
in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 9, at 101 (discussing China’s interest in “protecting 
the long-term health and stability of smaller competitors, as part of its interest in an orderly market 
and ‘industry self-discipline’”). 
122. See e.g. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 16, at 408.  Former Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping, for 
example, saw government encouragement of small and medium-size businesses as part of a 
program of economic reforms called “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.”  Id. 
123. See Jared A. Berry, Anti-Monopoly Law in China:  A Socialist Market Economy Wrestles with Its 
Antitrust Regime, 2 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 129, 144 (2005). 
124. Id. 
125. See Id. 
126. AML Ch. II, Art. 15 (3). 
127. AML Ch. II, Arts. 1 & 4. 
128. AML Ch. I, Art. 6.  See also AML Ch. IV, Arts. 27-28.  Article 27 states that the effect of economic 
concentrations on “consumers and other undertakings” must be considered in “the review of 
concentrations.”  Other undertakings can be interpreted to include both competitors and customers. 
Article 28 adds that “where a concentration of undertakings results in or may result in the effect of 
eliminating or restricting competition, the AMEA shall make a decision to prohibit the 
concentration.”  This stern and mandatory language suggests a strong interest in protecting small 
and medium-sized competitors.  
129. Oliver Q. C. Zhong, Dawn of a New Constitutional Era or Opportunity Wasted?  An Intellectual 
Reappraisal of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 24 COL. J. ASIAN L. 87, 106 (2010); See also Competition 
Policy and Enforcement in China, U.S.—China Bus. Council (Sept. 2014), at 12 (“Many questions 
remain unanswered about the objectives of China’s competition regime.  Among them:  Will China 
use the AML to protect domestic industry rather than promote fair competition?”). 
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May 2014 Conference in Beijing co-sponsored by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law 
and the Expert Advisory Committee of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Shang Ming, the Director General 
of MOFCOM’s Anti-Monopoly Bureau, admitted that “MOFCOM seeks comments 
from industrial regulators in its merger review practices and will continue to do 
so.”130  Director Ming further stated that “MOFCOM will continue to balance 
competition policies and industrial policies in its merger review.”131 
An early well-known example of MOFCOM’s interest in protecting small and 
medium-size Chinese businesses is MOFCOM’s 2009 decision to block Coca-Cola’s 
proposed acquisition of Huiyan, a Chinese juice producer.132  In its Public 
Announcement, MOFCOM indicated that it looked at several important factors 
under AML Art. 27, including “[t]he effect of the concentration on the development 
of the national economy.”133  MOFCOM concluded that “[t]he transaction would have 
an adverse impact on domestic small-and medium-sized enterprises in the fruit juice 
market and impair their ability to compete and innovate, negatively affecting the 
sound development of the Chinese juice industry.”134 
More recent MOFCOM decisions have shown a continuing concern for protecting 
and enhancing competitive opportunities for Chinese firms.  For example, in 
conditionally approving Merck’s acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials on April 30, 
2014, MOFCOM imposed licensing and behavioral remedies due to its concern that 
competitors could face unfair bundling and cross-subsidization competition that 
could “result in the marginalization or exit of competitors from the market.”135  
Similarly, on June 17, 2004, MOFCOM prohibited the formation of the proposed P3 
Network shipping alliance between Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping, and CMA 
GGM in part because the network could “suppress competitors’ room for 
development, increase the parties’ bargaining power vis-a’-vis ports, and harm the 
 
130. Client Memorandum from Davis Polk Law Firm 2 (June 5, 2014) (on file with author). 
131. Id. at 3.  The Director added that “[i]ndustrial regulators know their respective industries well and 
their comments often include information on industrial development trends, which helps MOFCOM 
identify competition problems and solve competition concerns.”  Id. at 2-3.  
132. Coca-Cola/Huiyan, MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 22, March 18, 2009. 
133. Id. at 2(5). 
134. Wang and Emch, supra note 108, at 9.  In section 4(3) of its Public Announcement, MOFCOM 
explained: 
The concentration would squeeze out small and medium-sized juice producers in China,
and restrain local producers from participating in competition in the juice beverage market 
and their ability for proprietary innovation, which would have a negative effect over 
effective competition in the Chinese juice beverage market, and would prove adverse to the 
sustained sound development of the juice beverage market in China. 
 MOFCOM Publ. Ann. 22, supra note 132, at 4(3). 
135. CHINA COMPETITION BULL. (32nd ed.  2014), at 3; citing http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/ 
201404/20140400569060.shtml.  
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interest of cargo owners.”136  More recently, MOFCOM played a potentially decisive 
role in catalyzing American and Japanese semiconductor and display industry 
giants Applied Materials and Tokyo Electron to abandon their proposed merger.  
MOFCOM believed that the proposed merger would have “a severe impact on the 
interests of Chinese chip manufacturing customers.”137 
Watching MOFCOM’s increasingly aggressive enforcement efforts unfold, it 
seems fair to predict that China will continue focusing, at least in the near term, on 
protecting its diverse multitude of small and medium-sized businesses, as well as 
national champions and core Chinese competitors in strategic businesses.138 
D. China Has Shown A Strong Propensity To Focus on Potential 
Barriers To Entry And The Use of Exclusionary Practices by 
Dominant Firms 
“[H]aving co-opted Western capitalism and mirrored many of its surface features, 
China today poses an unprecedented and profound challenge to Western capitalism 
that scholars and policymakers have only begun to grasp.”139  As previously 
discussed, divergent views about antitrust enforcement and different regulatory 
focuses “may arise from the unique and economic-specific national policies each 
country’s antitrust laws are designed to promote.”140  Consequently, “culturally 
embedded” competition laws, despite similarities in wordings, “may mean different 
things in different societies.”141  We should not therefore be surprised that Chinese 
Anti-Monopoly Law regulators are taking “into account specific social and economic 
 
136. CHINA COMPETITION BULL. (32nd ed. 2014), at 4, citing http://fldgj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/ 
201406/20140600628586.html. Interestingly, both the United States and European authorities had 
previously determined “that the alliance would not result in unreasonable increases in 
transportation costs through a reduction in competition.”  Id. at 5.  Unlike MOFCOM, “both took 
into account the parties’ argument that the alliance would result in operational efficiencies and 
benefit consumers.”  Id. 
137. See CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4 (36th ed. 2015), citing http://www/mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ 
ail201504/2015040095517.shtml; Interview with Tom Horton, Professor of Law at Univ. of S.D., 
supra n. 102, at 3-6 (discussing the various strategic considerations of the proposed deal from the 
perspectives of the United States, Japan, and China).  
138. See Lawrence S. Liu, All About Fair Trade? – Competitors Law in Taiwan and East Asian Economic 
Development, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 298 (2012) (arguing that China “resorts to serious industrial 
policy to foster national champions in strategic sectors….”); see also Berry, supra note 123, at 152 
(predicting that China’s AML enforcement “will likely reflect the CCP’s historically protectionist 
tendencies….”); Deborah Healey, Anti-Monopoly Law and Mergers in China:  An Early Report Card 
on Procedural and Substantive Issues, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 17, 26 (2010) (arguing that 
China’s “policy of promoting mergers and acquisitions to form large companies which will be 
internationally competitive, thereby creating national champions, is inconsistent with competition 
law principles”). 
139. Marshall W. Meyer, Is it Capitalism?, 7 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 5, 8 (2010). 
140. Farmer, Impact of China’s Antitrust Law, supra note 51, at 41.  
141. Liu, supra note 138, at 269. 
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circumstances in China, rather than uncritically importing the legislative models 
used in the U.S. and the E.U.”142   
The Chinese do not appear to be buying into the current extreme American 
judicial tolerance and even encouragement of concentrated industries143 and 
predatory conduct, as allegedly “important element[s] in the free market system.”144  
Instead, the Chinese are showing an increased interest in controlling and arresting 
the growth of monopolies and dominant firms.  China’s current interest parallels an 
ongoing trend in China towards economic decentralization.145  As previously 
discussed, many of China’s industries, “are characterized by small-scale firms and 
low market concentration ratios.”146  Throughout “China’s bustling cities, vast 
numbers of small businesses exist alongside the towers of industrial and corporate 
giants.”147   
Chapter III of China’s AML covers “Abuse of Dominant Market Position.”148  
Recent Chinese AML investigations show an emphasis on enforcing Chapter III.  
The focus seems to be on lowering potential barriers to entry for Chinese firms and 
controlling the use of potential exclusionary practices by dominant firms.149 
 
142. Dr. Yijun Tian, The Impacts of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law on IP Commercialization in China 
& General Strategies for Technology-Driven Companies and Future Regulators, 2010 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 004, ¶ 55 (2010). 
143. See e.g. Sam Peltzman, Industrial Concentration Under the Rule of Reason, 57 J. L. & ECON. S101 
(2014) (finding that concentration for American manufacturing has increased since 1982, due 
largely to the relaxation of antitrust merger standards); Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra 
note 5, at 224 (discussing the trend of growing economic consolidation in the United States); 
WALTER A. ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX:  INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND 
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY  (2d ed. 2004); TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA:  THE RISE 
OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 100 (2005) (discussing the rapidly 
accelerating trend to concentration); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, MEGA MERGERS: CORPORATE 
AMERICA’S BILLION-DOLLAR TAKEOVERS (2003). 
144. Rudolph J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA:  1888-1992:  HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 239 
(1996) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 28 (2d ed. 2001).  See also Verizon Commc’ns, 
Inv. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); Thomas J. Horton, Unraveling the 
Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix.  Applying Evolutionary Theory to Guard Competitors and 
Revive Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 615, 616 (2012); Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust 
Goals, supra note 2, at 555-557 (discussing how antitrust in the United States is no longer 
interested in “arresting economic power in its incipiency”). 
145. See e.g. Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China, supra note 37, at 656; Yingyi Qian & Chenggang 
Xu, Why China’s Economic Reforms Differ:  The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the 
Non-State Sector, 1 ECON. TRANSITION 135, 145-47 (1993). 
146. Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China, supra note 37, at 710.  Zheng adds that “[o]fficial statistics 
indicate that market concentration ratios in China have been unusually low when compared to both 
developed and developing countries.”  Id.; see Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 
224-26.  
147. Id. at 224.  
148. AML Ch. III. 
149. AML Article 17 defines a “dominant market position” as one that “enables the undertakings to 
control the price or quantity of products or other trading conditions in the relevant market or to 
impede or affect the entry of other undertakings into the relevant market.”  Articles 18 and 19 set 
Emerging International Issues in China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Efforts 
133 
In several recent merger investigations, MOFCOM has found that proposed 
transactions were likely to lead to heightened barriers to entry and the suppression 
of possible growth and development by competitors.  As an example in imposing 
various conditions on Merck’s acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials, MOFCOM 
observed “that there were high barriers to entry,” including Merck’s holding more 
than 3,500 patents in the liquid crystals display market.150  MOFCOM expressed 
similar concerns about high barriers to entry in its second decision unconditionally 
blocking a proposed merger.  MOFCOM announced that the transaction would 
“increase the already high barriers to entry, [and] suppress competitors’ room for 
development” in blocking the proposed P3 Network Shipping Alliance among 
Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping, and CMA CGM.151 
Special attention also has been paid in recent months to bundling, and the 
licensing of intellectual property and technology. 
1. Bundling 
AML Article 17(5) forbids undertakings with dominant market positions 
“[w]ithout valid justification, tying in products or imposing other unreasonable 
trading conditions.”152  In 2013, China’s SAIC began investigating Microsoft’s alleged 
bundling of various software products and functions, “raising the prospect of China 
revisiting the software bundling issue at the heart of past antitrust complaints 
against the firm in the West.”153  In a July 29, 2014, Press Release, SAIC suggested 
that its investigation concerns “Microsoft’s Windows operating system and its Office 
software suite, and relate[s] to issues of interoperability, bundling and document 
 
forth a number of factors that can be employed in determining whether undertakings have a 
dominant market position, including market share, financial and technical status, and the 
“difficulty for other undertakings to enter the relevant market.”  AML Ch. III, Art. 18.  A single 
undertaking with a 50% share of a relevant market is presumed under Article 19 to have a 
dominant market position. 
150. MOFCOM Conditionally Approves Merck’s Acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials, CHINA 
COMPETITION BULL. 3 (32nd ed. 2014).  Additional barriers to entry included photoresist suppliers 
having to go through a technical certification process that lasts two to three years.  Id. 
151. MOFCOM Prohibits the Formation of the P3 Network Shipping Alliance Among Maersk, 
Mediterranean Shipping, and CMA CGM, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4 (32nd ed. 2014).  MOFCOM 
has consistently voiced concerns about transactions potentially increasing barriers to entry since 
2009.  See e.g. MOFCOM Announcement [2009] No. 77 Regarding Conditional Approval of Pfizer’s 
Acquisition of Wyeth, Sept. 29, 2009, at 4 (3) (iii) (discussing the high barriers to entry in imposing 
conditions on Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth). 
152. AML Ch. III, Art. 17(3). 
153. Reuters in Beijing, Chinese antitrust regulator targets Microsoft software bundling, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, August 26, 2014, available at http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/ 
1580794/chinese-antitrust-regulator-targets.  See also Gerry Shih & Paul Carsten, Chinese 
antitrust regulator targets Microsoft’s web browser, media player, REUTERS, August 26, 2014, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBNOGQ06920140826.   
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authentication.”154  SAIC’s high profile and controversial investigation was 
accompanied by a corresponding article in The People’s Daily, the CCP’s chief 
newspaper, warning foreign companies that:  “In the future, the focus on market 
order will continue to be constantly enhanced.  Every kind of business should adjust 
its behavior and thinking to this new regulatory normal.”155 
San Diego-based chipmaker Qualcomm also recently found itself punished 
severely by China’s NDRC for bundling patent licenses to the sale of chips and 
imposing unreasonable conditions on patent licensing and chip sales.156  China’s 
NDRC announced in late December, 2014, that it was nearing a settlement with 
Qualcomm following a controversial thirteen month probe.157  China defended its 
controversial probe of Qualcomm as “in line with the global reaction.”158  A little over 
two months later, on February 10, 2015, the NDRC announced its findings that 
Qualcomm had abused its dominant market position, and imposed a massive fine of 
RMB 6.088 billion, which was equal to 8% of Qualcomm’s 2013 sales revenues in 
China.159 
Like SAIC, MOFCOM also has shown great interest in curbing potential bundling 
by dominant firms.  For example, in conditionally approving Merck’s acquisition of 
AZ Electronic Materials on April 30, 2014, “MOFCOM found that the acquisition 
would give Merck the ability to bundles sales of liquid crystal displays (LCD) and 
photoresist.”160  MOFCOM therefore required Merck “not to bundle the sale of or 
cross-subsidise LCD and photoresist products or otherwise directly or indirectly 
force Chinese companies to purchase the products together.”161 
China also has begun announcing substantial penalties against foreign 
companies for price-fixing and market sharing.  For example, on August 20, 2014, 
 
154. Avmeric Dumas-Eumard, China Ramps Up Antitrust Enforcement With Second Round of Raids of 
Microsoft Today, CONSTANTINE CANNON ANTITRUST TODAY BLOG, August 6, 2014, 
http://www.antitrusttoday.com/2014/08/06/china. 
155. Neil Gough, Chris Buckley & Nick Wingfield, China’s Energetic Enforcement of Antitrust Rules 
Alarms Foreign Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
08/11/business/international/china8217s-energetic-enforcement-of-antitrust-rules-alarms-foreign-
firms.html. 
156. See e.g. Update on the NDRC’s Investigation of Qualcomm, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 5 (33rd ed. 
2014);Reuters, China Investigating Qualcomm’s Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/technology/china-investigating-qualcomms-pricing.html.  
157. See e.g. Michael Perrault, Qualcomm Antitrust Probe Reportedly Nearing End, INVESTOR’S BUS. 
DAILY, Dec. 26, 2014, available at http://news.investors.com/technology/122614-732175-qualcomm.  
158. See Zhang Lulu, How Qualcomm got involved in China’s antitrust probes, CHINA. ORG. CN., October 
16, 2014, available at http://www.china.org.cn/business/2014-10/16/content_33780954.htm.  
159. CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 3 (35th ed. 2015) citing http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/g2dt/201502/ 
t2015021a663872.html.  The NDRC found that Qualcomm had abused its dominant position in 
licensing patents essential to wireless communication to Chinese licensees. 
160. Mofcom Conditionally Approves Merck’s Acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials, CHINA 
COMPETITION BULL. 3 (32nd ed. 2014). 
161. Id. 
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the NDRC announced record fines totaling over RMB 1.2 billion against eight 
Japanese auto parts and four Japanese bearings manufacturers.162 
China’s investigations of Microsoft, Merck, Qualcomm, and others have sparked 
fierce protests of unfair discrimination against foreign companies.163  China 
inevitably responds to criticisms of discrimination against foreign companies by 
arguing that its AML regulators have not been afraid to pursue local investigations.  
They point out that China’s AML enforcers have brought numerous local price-fixing 
and market sharing cases.164   Similarly, in the abuse of dominance sector, China 
can point to several local bundling investigations and cases.165  For example, on July 
30, 2014, China’s SAIC fined the Inner Mongolia Tobacco Company (Chifeng 
Tobacco) “for abusing its dominant market position in the cigarette wholesale 
market in Chifeng by bundling the sales of various brands of cigarettes.”166  
Similarly, on July 28, 2014, a Beijing trial court fined Baidu for bundling Qihoo 360’s 
software with Baidu’s products.167  However, such minor investigations and cases 
are unlikely to quell the rising storm of foreign protests against China’s allegedly 
discriminatory and protectionist AML enforcement activities. 
2. Licensing of Intellectual Property and Patents 
Expansively pressing for the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) 
licensing of intellectual property rights (IPR) is perhaps the single area where the 
Chinese have been the most aggressive against foreign companies.  Although AML 
 
162. NDRC Imposes Record Fines on Japanese Auto Parts and Bearing Manufacturers for Price-Fixing, 
CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 2 (33rd ed. 2014).  The Japanese companies included such giants as 
Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsuba, and Sumitomo Electric.  
163. See, e.g., Gough, Buckley & Wingfield, supra note 155 (“Foreign companies worry that 
investigations could represent the rise of a newer, subtler form of protectionism, one cloaked in 
regulatory impartiality but intended to promote Chinese companies, especially the big, powerful 
state-owned companies”); Bruce Einhorn, Foreigners Cry Foul as China Widens Antimonopoly 
Probes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 14, 2014, available at http://www.businessweek.com. 
printer/articles/219299-foreigners.  (“The backlash to China’s latest campaign against foreign 
companies has begun.  The country’s antimonopoly enforcers have been on a tear….”). 
164. See, e.g., Hainan Price Bureau Fines Aerated Bricks Cartel, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 3 (33rd ed. 
2014); Three Cement Companies in Jilin Province Fined RMB 114 Million for Price-Fixing, CHINA 
COMPETITION BULL. 2 (34th ed. 2014); Insurance Industry Players in Zhejiang Province Fined More 
than RMB 110 Million, Id. at 1. 
165. As an example, at the annual World Economic Forum in Tianjin in September 2014, Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang argued that “only 10% of AML investigations involved foreign companies.  
Premier Li defended China’s antitrust enforcement, stating that Chinese AML enforcement 
agencies would not enforce regulations selectively or target certain groups of companies.”  CHINA 
COMPETITION BULL. 5 (34th ed. 2014).  Anti-Unfair Competition Bureau Director-General Ren 
Airong similarly argued that of thirty-nine then current SAIC investigations, only two involved 
foreign companies.  Id.  
166. Inner Mongolia AIC Sanctions Abuse of Dominance in the Cigarette Wholesale Market, CHINA 
COMPETITION BULL. 4 (33rd ed. 2014). 
167. Baidu Loses Bundled Sales Case Against Qihoo 360, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4 (33rd ed. 2014). 
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Article 55 initially exempts from its ambit the use of IPR, it immediately adds:  
“however, this Law is applicable to conducts of undertakings that abuse their 
intellectual property rights to eliminate or restrict competition.”168 China’s AML 
enforcement authorities have interpreted and applied Article 55 aggressively and 
expansively, especially in the context of requiring FRAND licensing of IPR in 
conditional merger and acquisition approvals. 
On June 11, 2014, SAIC released a revised draft regulations concerning the abuse 
of IPR.169  SAIC ultimately published its final Regulation on the Prohibition of 
Conduct Eliminating or Restricting Competition Through the Abuse of Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR Regulation) on April 7, 2015.170  Articles 4 through 15 describe 
at length potential prohibited uses of IPR, and are especially pointed at 
“undertakings with dominant market positions.”171  Article 1 observes that the rules 
have been drafted “in order to protect competition and encourage innovation, as well 
as to prohibit the use of [IPR] by undertakings to eliminate or restrict 
competition.”172  The IPR Regulation effectively imposes obligations on dominant 
companies to license their IPR on “reasonable terms” if that IPR is an essential 
facility for production or operation unless they can provide a valid reason for not 
doing so.173 
Prior to SAIC’s new IPR rules, several major Chinese cases addressed IPR issues.  
In the Huawei v. InterDigital cases,174 Chinese courts found that InterDigital had 
abused its dominant position in exercising its IPR rights through such conduct as 
bundling the licensing of its standard essential patents (SEPs) with non-SEPs.175  
 
168. AML Ch. VII, Art. 55.  See also WANG, supra note 10, at 217-229. 
169. See Rules of the Administration for Industry and Commerce on the Prohibition of Abuses of 
Intellectual Property Rights for the Purposes of Eliminating or Restricting Competition, June 11, 
2014.  (Draft IP Rules) SAIC hopes to finalize the regulations in 2015.  SAIC has been drafting the 
regulations since 2009, and has received numerous comments from Chinese and foreign entities 
throughout the long process.  Article 5 of the draft rules includes several important “safe harbor” 
provisions. 
170. See CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 2 (36th ed. 2015). 
171. See Draft IP Rules Arts. 4-15.  A full discussion of SAIC’s draft rules is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
172. Draft IP Rules Art. 1. Article 2 adds that “[t]he AML shares the same goal with intellectual property 
protection, which is to promote innovation and competition, improve efficiency and consumer 
welfare and public interest of the society.” 
173. Id., citing http://www.saic.gov.cn/ywdt/gsyw/zjyw/xxb/201504/t20150414_155126.html. 
174. Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court, Huawei v. InterDigital, Feb. 4, 2013, [2011] Shen Zhong Fa 
Zhi Min Chu Zi No. 857 and No. 858; Guangdong High People’s Court, Huawei v. InterDigital, Oct. 
16, 2013, [2013] Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 and 306. 
175. See Ye Ruosi, Zhu Jianjun & Chen Wenquan, Determination of Whether Abuse of Dominance by 
Standard Essential Patent Owners Constitutes Monopoly:  Comments on the Antitrust Lawsuit 
Huawei v. InterDigital, 3 ELECTR. INTELL. PROP. 46 (2013).  On May 22, 2014, the NDRC announced 
the suspension of its investigation into InterDigital after InterDigital reached a settlement with 
Chinese company Huawei, and committed to not charge Chinese companies discriminatory and 
high licensing fees, not bundle non-SEPs with SEP licenses, not require that Chinese companies 
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Building upon such cases, SAIC’s rules contain ten articles that address the 
potential abuse of dominance in exercising IPR.  “With regard to the types of abusive 
conduct, the draft SAIC IPR Regulation focuses on refusal to license; exclusive 
dealing; tying [bundling]; imposing unreasonable conditions; discrimination; patent 
pools; standard essential patents; copy right collecting societies; and abuses through 
warning letters.”176  A number of unreasonable conditions in dominant companies’ 
exercise of their IPR also are set forth.177 
Considered together with MOFCOM’s aggressive use of IPR licensing 
requirements in its conditional approval of mergers,178 it appears that China 
increasingly will use its AML to help its indigenous companies gain favorable access 
to IPR held by foreign companies.  This aggressive posture likely reflects China’s 
recognition that “the country’s innovators still have a way to go before they can meet 
the Communist Party’s expectations.”179  While “China has strengthened its 
commitment to R & D to support the government’s drive towards innovation…, [t]he 
reality is that China remains heavily reliant on foreign IP.”180  Even though China 
has surpassed the United States and Japan in filing patents, “many of them [have] 
little value; they [have] been filed to meet political targets or attract funding.”181 
Consequently, “[a]ccess to technology and development of domestic, ‘indigenous’ 
technology are key factors in China’s development strategy.”182  Such developments 
lend strong credence to increasing foreign concerns that China will use its AML to 
promote its domestic research and development needs. 
 
license their IP for free to InterDigital, and not force Chinese companies to accept unreasonable 
licensing conditions through litigation.  See NDRC Suspends Its Investigation Into InterDigital, 
CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 7 (32nd ed. 2014). 
176. Adrain Emch & Liyang Hou, Antitrust Regulation of IPRs –China’s First Proposal, COMPETITION 
POLICY INT’L 7 (2014). 
177. Id. at 8.  These include among others exclusive dealing and exclusive grant-backs for derived 
technology. 
178. See, e.g., MOFCOM Conditionally Approves Merck’s Acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials, CHINA 
COMPETITION BULL. 3 (32nd ed. 2014) (discussing MOFCOM’s requirements that Merck “offer LCD 
patent licenses on a non-exclusive, non-transferable, fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 
basis”). 
179. Bruce Einhorn, China’s Government Admits Chinese Patents Are Pretty Bad, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, June 23, 2014.  See also Christina Larson, A Peek Into the ‘Black Box’ of Where 
China’s Hefty R & D Budget Goes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2014, (discussing the 
massive graft and corruption in China’s research fields). 
180. Dr. Zhan Hao, SAIC Moves Closer to Antitrust Rules for IP, CHINA LAW VISION, July 10, 2014, 
available at http://www.chinalawvision.com/2014/07/articles/competitionantitrust-law-of-the/saic-
mov. 
181. OSNOS, supra note 26, at 320.  Similarly, while China is producing more scientific papers than 
anywhere but the United States, they are not even ranked in the top ten in terms of quality.  Id.  
Osnos argues that academic fraud is still rampant in China.  Id. 
182. Emch & Hou, supra note 9, at 10. 
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III. China’s Recent AML Enforcement Activities Have Drawn 
Harsh and Scathing Criticisms From Western Governments 
and Business Interests 
China’s aggressive AML enforcement activities are coming under increasing 
international scrutiny and rapidly escalating criticism.  Perhaps the harshest 
criticism has come from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which released a scathing 
report on September 9, 2014, on the “Competing Interest in China’s Competition 
Law Enforcement.”183  In its well-written and comprehensive 85-page Report, the 
Chamber alleges that China’s AML and its enforcement are not living up to the ideal 
of competitive markets, and that China is using its AML “to advance policy and boost 
national champions.”184  The Chamber is especially appalled by what it considers to 
be China’s “[s]ystemic, officially sanctioned curtailment of IP rights,”185 and the 
“[d]ue process deficiencies, [which] facilitate these problems.”186 The Chamber adds 
that “foreign companies suffer disproportionately from China’s patterns of enforcing 
the AML.  In fact, all transactions blocked or conditionally approved to date have 
involved foreign companies, and the curtailment of IP rights appears designed to 
strengthen the bargaining position of domestic licenses.”187  Indeed, the Chamber 
alleges that China’s AML enforcement is violating the commitments that China 
undertook in joining the World Trade Organization (WTO).188 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is hardly alone in voicing such concerns.  For 
example, in a September 2014 Report, the U.S.—China Business Council (USCBC) 
observed that “foreign companies have well-founded concerns about how 
investigations are conducted and decided.  China’s legal framework for antitrust 
enforcement provides opportunities for protectionism and industrial policy to sway 
decisions.”189 
Joining this growing chorus, the USCC filed a lengthy report with the United 
 
183. United States Chamber of Commerce, Competing Interests in China’s Competition Law 
Enforcement:  China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Application and the Role of Industrial Policy, Sept. 9, 
2014. 
184. Id. at ii.  The Chamber adds that “[t]he beneficiaries of these policies are often Chinese national 
champions in industries that China considers strategic, such as commodities and high technology.”  
Id. at 2.  
185. Id. at 77. 
186. Id. at 78. 
187. Id. at 2. 
188. Neil Gough, China’s Antitrust Campaign Seen as Possible Breach of W.T.O. Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/business/international/us-group-says-china. 
189. U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, COMPETITION POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 13 (2014), available 
at https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/AML%202014%20Report%20FINAL_0.pdf.  The 
Report adds that “Chinese competition practices can create de facto discrimination against foreign 
companies by not giving proper weight to market considerations.”  Id. 
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States Congress in November, 2014.190  Noting the steadily growing trade imbalance 
between the United States and China, the Commission concluded that “[t]he 
bilateral trade imbalance is driven, in large part, by China’s mercantilist and state-
directed policies.”191  The Commission additionally alleged that “[i]n 2014, China 
ramped up its use of Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) against foreign firms in what 
appears to be unequal enforcement in order to create favorable market conditions 
for Chinese competitors.”192  The American Chamber of Commerce in China and the 
European Union Chamber of Commerce have issued similar 2014 reports “accusing 
China of unfair enforcement of the AML.”193 
More recently, on December 5, 2014, the Congressional Research Service 
prepared a Report for Congress summarizing the various business community 
criticisms of China’s AML enforcement.194  The scope and intensity of such concerns 
should not be minimized.  John Frisbie, the President of the USCBC, noted that a 
recent survey “found that 86% of respondents said they are least somewhat 
concerned about the way the AML has been implemented.”195  Widespread reported 
concerns included unfair treatment and discrimination, a lack of due process and 
regulatory transparency, lengthy time for merger reviews, and the process through 
which remedies and fines are determined.196 
Various United States antitrust officials also have joined the chorus.  For 
example, on September 16, 2014, Federal Trade Commissioner Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen expressed strong concerns that “the Chinese may be moving away from 
rather than towards international norms.”197  Commissioner Ohlhausen expressed 
strong support for “a growing chorus claiming that the Chinese are using the AML 
to promote industrial policy.”198  FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has voiced similar 
 
190. U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2014), available 
at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF. 
191. Id. at 3.  The Report continues:  “Although China promised extensive market reforms when it joined 
the WTO, it has been reluctant to implement them.  Instead, the Chinese government has 
institutionalized preferences for state-owned enterprises and favored industries, particularly in 
areas designated as ‘strategic.’”  Id. 
192. Id. at 60.  The Report adds:  “Chinese regulators and state media have disproportionately targeted 
foreign firms operating in China with accusations ranging from monopolistic behavior to 
exploitation of Chinese consumers.”  Id. 
193. Id.  See also Michael Martina, EU Lobby Piles in on Foreign Criticism of China’s Antitrust 
Enforcement, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/uk-china-antitrust-
eu-idUKKBN0H40SB20140909. 
194. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA–U.S. TRADE ISSUES 25-27 (2014), available 
at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=761176. 
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concerns,199 as has United States Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust 
Bill Baer.200  Furthermore, “China and the United States’ adversarial relationship 
has been marked by frequent litigation in the World Trade Organization (WTO).”201 
Not surprisingly, Chinese officials deny that they are targeting or discriminating 
against foreign companies in enforcing their AML.202  For example, on September 
10, 2014, the day after the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Report was released, Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang delivered a speech to 1000 business leaders attending a World 
Economic Forum meeting in Tianjin. China Premier Li observed:  “China continues 
to welcome foreign investment, and the door will open even further.”203  The next 
day, Key Chinese AML enforcement officials held an additional briefing to refute the 
various allegations.204  Similarly, on April 15, 2015, Zhang Handong, the new 
Director General of the NDRC Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau, met 
with the Chairman of the USCC and representatives of such companies as GE, Dell, 
and Intel in an attempt to convince them “that antitrust enforcement in China does 
not discriminate against any particular company or sector.”205 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding China’s vigorous protestations and denials, a 
review of China’s AML enforcement activities since 2008 lends strong credence to 
the allegations that the primary targets of major AML enforcement initiatives have 
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said that they are not focusing specifically on foreign companies and that equal treatment is being 
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investors-we-want-you.  Premier Li defended China’s antitrust enforcement, stating that “only 10% 
of AML investigations involved foreign companies.”  See CHINA COMPETITION RESEARCH CTR., 
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(34th ed. 2014). 
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been foreign companies.  Chinese officials and their CCP-controlled press have been 
unapologetic in simultaneously issuing warnings that foreign companies need “to 
get used to tougher scrutiny,”206 and “must strictly comply with Chinese rules and 
laws and fulfill their social obligations.”207   
China’s unwillingness to give more serious consideration to the escalating 
allegations and criticisms of its AML enforcement activities is cause for grave 
concern.  Given the rising rhetoric and concerns on both sides, it seems that we may 
be headed for a dangerous clash sparked by two very different antitrust regulatory 
systems.208 
IV. Conclusion 
China’s recent AML enforcement activities and initiatives confirm that China is 
determined to chart its own course, and not be “the tail of someone else’s dog.”209  
China’s current course indicates that China will aggressively pursue AML 
enforcement with the goal of creating “fair market competition” and protecting the 
“consumer and public interests” of China’s citizens.  China is likely to continue using 
its AML to protect its long-term security and economic interest, and to protect the 
competitive opportunities for its small and medium-sized businesses.  In so doing, 
China is likely to continue aggressively seeking to break down perceived barriers to 
entry and to block exclusionary practices by firms with perceived dominant market 
positions. 
Like it or not, the United States and other Western countries and businesses are 
going to have to accept that China views itself as different, and that its view of its 
“socialist market economy” is vastly different from our view of free markets.210  We 
need to come to grips with the reality that Chinese antitrust in the next decade is 
unlikely to mimic our post-Chicago antitrust system, and its grounding in 
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supposedly neutral and scientific neoclassical economic models. 
Rather than wasting time criticizing China and trying to lure it into following 
current American models, we should humbly ask ourselves whether we might learn 
from the Chinese and their Confucian traditions and values.  As this author 
previously has argued, China should be lauded for seeking to pursue an aggressive 
antitrust policy that takes into account Confucian norms of ethics, morals, and 
fairness, and seeks to inspire increased corporate social responsibility.211 
On the other hand, the Chinese and their AML enforcers are going to need to pay 
more attention going forward to their own Confucian traditions and values, as 
well.212  Ongoing business and governmental corruption in China must be 
aggressively addressed.  Furthermore, the Chinese need to acknowledge and 
realistically address the pressures on their AML enforcers to aggressively target 
foreign companies in order to protect and bolster indigenous Chinese companies and 
businesses.  Instead of trying to pretend that they are acting neutrally and 
objectively in their AML enforcement, the Chinese need to find better ways to focus 
primarily on competition policies, as opposed to industrial protectionism.  The 
ultimate regulatory question must become what is best for economic competition in 
China, rather than what is best for the CCP’s long-term interest in maintaining its 
tight grip on power. 
As always, the future is uncertain.  But the stakes could not be higher.  Whether 
we like it or not, China’s and our economies are inextricably linked and positively 
correlated.213  Both China and the West must continue their ongoing dialogues, and 
seek to continue building strong economic, cultural, and political bridges.214  After 
all, much more than future international antitrust enforcement is at stake. 
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